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Although the stock market is a reasonably efficient pricing mecha-
nism, there are times when some of the laws of mathematics seem not to
apply. Two plus two should equal four, but in the stock market the result
is sometimes five, and sometimes three. Dramatic price changes can
result, and many changes recently have been related to takeovers, merg-
ers, and restructurings. While critics decry raiders, debt-hungry man-
agements, or short-term-oriented investors, the wave of restructurings
is symptomatic of a much broader, deeper, more enduring change in the
financial markets.
Three Phases of Financial Markets
We have entered an era of corporate valuation, which is the third
phase that the stock market has experienced in the postwar period. The
key players in financial markets over the past 40 years have been indi-
viduals, institutions, and corporations. Success has depended upon
identifying the particular set of players with the greatest influence on
prices at each point in ~ime. Table 1 describes three principal periods
since World War II: The Age of the Individual Investor, The Age of the
Institutional Investor and The Age of Corporate Valuation.
The Age of the Individual Investor
From 1940 until the late 1960s, individual investors were the domi-
nant force in setting stock prices. This was the era of the stock picker, the
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research analyst, and the "star" portfolio manager. Passions ran high,
and investors tended to "fall in love" with stocks. They were impatient
with bad news and often obsessed with getting "the latest story." Ulti-
mately, stocks were offered with nothing but projections, because the
fundamentals were practically nonexistent. However, at the height of
this "go-go" mania in 1968, individuals began a 15-year liquidation of
their holdings of common stocks.
The Age of the Institutional Investor
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, a new force emerged to set
stock prices. As institutional portfolios swelled with cash flow from pen-
sion funds, institutional investors became the primary factor in the stock
market. With them came the computer revolution on Wall Street. Apply-
ing quantitative techniques to financial databases, they used dividend
discount models and price screens based on academic research to set the
prices of stocks to within a few basis points, based on key value mea-
sures. These institutions are dispassionate: they do not care about con-
trol, they just want cheap stocks that go up. Their activity has made the
market more efficient relative to their popular measures of value: price/
earnings, price/book, yield, and so forth. Their activity also set the stage
for a fresh perspective on value.80 Dean LeBaron and Lawrence S. Speidell
The Age of Corporate Valuation
Over the past 20 years, a gap has opened between stock market
values and the replacement cost of underlying corporate assets. At first
this gap was noticed by only a few individual entrepreneurial business-
men such as T. Boone Pickens, Carl Ichan, and Irv Jacobs. These men
earned a reputation as "raiders," yet they were simply setting a business
value on companies that was above the stock market price. They gave
free-riding shareholders much of the gain. The initial response of corpo-
rations to raiders was a surge in antitakeover provisions, but sharehold-
er outcry led to awareness that management entrenchment is not the
solution.
Today, corporations themselves, encouraged by their investment
bankers, are noticing the discrepancy in values. Their analysis of liquida-
tion value, replacement value, and undedicated cash flow includes off-
balance-sheet items (pension assets and liabilities, LIFO reserves, tax
losses); tax considerations (the write-up of acquired assets, spinoff of tax
shelters, capture of the tax shield from debt leverage); and "soft" assets
(the control premium, market share, goodwill, and potential synergy).
As a result, corporate behavior is increasingly dominated by financial
considerations, where in the past it was often dictated by sales, market-
ing, production, or tradition. Many successful companies are now led by
chief executives with a finance background.
"Chop Shop:" The Analysis of Companies by Business
Segment
As a money manager in search of undervalued opportunities, Bat-
terymarch Financial Management has recently been exploring corporate
behavior with respect to the business segment data disclosed in foot-
notes to corporate annual reports. Since 1976, companies have been
required by Statement 14 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board to
disclose details of the operations of their business segments. This infor-
mation has been collected by Compustat and is made available on com-
puter tapes.
Over 6,000 companies disclose business segment results, covering
over 10,000 divisions. Although most companies have only one or two
segments, a few list as many as 10. The distribution is as follows:
Number of Segments:     1    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Companies: 4819 818 532 272 106 40 18 9 4 1
Our goal is to value companies by their parts, in the hope of identifying
those firms where the whole is selling for less than the sum of values ofA CORPORATE VALUATION MODEL 81
the parts, and others where the reverse is true. We began this project
with several a priori notions to be tested:
(1) The market as a whole may be undervalued. Federal Reserve System
statistics through 1985 show that stocks have been selling for
90 percent of replacement cost (figure 1). The postwar range
has been from lows of around 50 percent in the late 1940s and
again in the 1970s to a high of 105 percent in the mid-1960s.
Batterymarch estimates show that the market value of corpo-
rate equity is now 71 percent of replacement cost.
(2) Undervaluation may be proportional to the number of segments in a
company.. In the 1960s, conglomerates sold at a premium in the
market, but lately synergy among divisions has been discredit-
ed and the complexity of such companies has made them of
less interest to investors. They may sell at a discount for three
reasons:
(a) There is a high cost to obtaining information about them.
(b) Managers may be hoarding cash for internal expansion
and acquisitions rather than maximizing shareholder
returns.
(c) Just as closed-end mutual funds sell at a discount, diverse
companies may be valued at a discount because share-
holders lack control over disposition of their assets.
(3) Stocks with low institutional holdings may be inefficiently priced.
Their prices may be significantly different (either higher or low-
er) from the prices of the stocks of similar, more popular
companies.
(4) Industries may fall into distinct patterns of valuation. Different
weights may be attached to sales, assets, and income, depend-
ing upon the economic sector or industry group.
Compustat has made business segment information available for
some time, but we believe that our exploration of these data is innova-
tive. Most users have focused only on company-by-company analysis,
while others have used the data for risk measurement (exposures to
each industry) rather than for valuation. Although we enjoy the oppor-
tunity to be pioneers, we would not achieve our goal of successful in-
vesting unless others follow our path, arbitraging some of these price
disparities out of the market. We believe that this process is beginning,
although today, investment bankers, bankers, and corporations are far
ahead of institutional investors in using business segment valuation
techniques. While institutions continue to focus on net earnings (after
profitable and unprofitable divisions are combined), corporations them-
selves are increasingly aware of the values of their segments and are
restructuring to make those values more evident in stock prices. In this
era of corporate valuation in the stock market, institutions will have to
adopt corporate techniques if they are to identify the best values.82 Dean LeBaron and Lawrence S. Speidell
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Methodology
Business segment disclosures include sales, assets, operating in-
come, depreciation, and capital spending for each division as well as
similar details for each geographic region. Our work has focused on the
first three items of data: sales, assets, and operating income by division.
The divisions are grouped by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC),
allowing analysis of very narrow industry slices such as the 4-digit SIC
2893-Carbon Black, or broader groupings such as the 2-digit SIC 28-
Chemicals and Allied Products (which includes SIC 2893).
Borrowing the terminology of automobile theft rings, our "Chop
Shop" analytical technique divides the 6,000 companies into their more
than 10,000 divisions, sorts them by SIC code, and calculates a set of
ratios for each code. Each of the 600 SIC codes may contain from one toA CORPORATE VALUATION MODEL 83
over 30 companies or divisions of companies. For "pure" companies
(with 90 percent of sales within one SIC code) we calculate the total
value of capitalization, including debt, compared with total sales, assets,
and income. The ratio of capitalization to sales, for example, represents
the theoretical value of a dollar of sales in the industry, based on the
aggregate of all pure companies in it.
"Chop Shop" requires at least three pure companies within a SIC
code in order to value it. For codes with fewer pure companies, valu-
ation ratios are computed on the basis of the next larger SIC category
(going from 4-digit 2893, for example, to 3-digit 289 or even to 2-digit 28
if necessary).
Table 2 shows a sample company, Dow Chemical, valued on the
basis of its four business segments: Basic Chemicals, Industrial Special-
ties, Consumer Specialties, and Basic Plastics. The valuation ratio based
on sales for Industrial Specialties is 0.61; in other words, a dollar of sales
in SIC 2821 is "worth" $0.61, derived by dividing the capitalization of
pure companies in the industry by their total sales. Similarly, a dollar of
assets in the industry is "worth" $1.07. Given Dow’s Industrial Special-
ties assets of $2,206 million, the division has a theoretical value based on
assets of $2,360.4 million.
The theoretical values for the industry and for all Dow divisions are
totaled for the sales analysis, the assets analysis, and the operating in-
come analysis. Then, these three company totals are averaged. From this
final theoretical value for the company, debt is deducted to produce the
theoretical equity value. The ratio of theoretical to actual equity value
indicates overvaluation or undervaluation by the market. In the case of
Dow, the ratio of theoretical to actual market value is 1.2: thus, the
company may be worth 20 percent more than the current stock price. By
comparison, a model not relying on business segments, the financial
tension valuation model, theoretically values Dow at 1.8, or 80 percent
above the current market value.
Within our data base, a ratio of 1.2 is close to the median. Exception-
ally undervalued companies may have segment values 50 percent or
more above their market prices. The high median value suggests that
there is some undervaluation in the market as a whole, which can prob-
ably be attributed to underpricing of both multi-industry companies and
small companies.
In refining our "Chop Shop" calculations, we have added several
constraints to cope with special conditions. If an SIC group has a ratio of
market capitalization to operating income greater than 20, we test for
depressed return on assets (ROA under 10 percent). Where returns are
low we set the industry income ratio to the average for all industries
(13.7) to prevent companies with large earnings in a depressed industry
from being overvalued. This is also done with industries operating at a84 Dean LeBaron and Lawrence S. Spefdell
Table 2





Dow Industry Ratio of Dow’s
Segment Market Capital to Theoretical
Sales Sales Market Value
2800 Basic Chemicals 5,237.0 2.29 11,992.7
2821 Industrial Specialties 2,765.0 0.61 1,686.6
2834 Consumer Specialties 2,029.0 3.58 7,263.8
3079 Basic Plastics ~ 1.71 2,575.3
Total 11,537.0 23,518.5
B) Assets Analysis
Dow industry Ratio of Dow’s
Segment Market Capital to Theoretical
SIC Code Assets Assets Market Value
2800 Basic Chemicals 4,762.0 2.43 11,571.7
2821 Industrial Specialties 2,206.0 1.07 2,360.4
2834 Consumer Specialties 1,645.0 2.92 4,803.4
3079 Basic Plastics 1,079.0 2.18 2,352.2
Total 9,629.0 21,087.7
loss. Loss divisions in loss industries are valued with the income compo-
nent set to zero, while profitable divisions in those industries use the
income ratio of 13.7.
Another adjustment is made for unallocated expenses. Companies
vary in their definition of operating earnings, and often large expenses
are simply not allocated to the divisions. We have defined operating
income uniformly as "pretax plus interest expense." Rather than directly
allocating other expenses, we assign them a negative value in the in-
come calculation, which is multiplied by a weighted average of all divi-
sions’ income ratios. Interest expense is not allocated because this stage
of valuation is independent of capital structure.
Additional modifications are undergoing research. Most significant
would be to vary the weighting of sales, assets, and income in the final
theoretical value for each division. This could be done inversely to the
scatter of data, or we eould replace ratios with regression equations for
each industry. We are experimenting with several regression techniques.
If we had unlimited computer power, we could simply regress market
values for the 6,000 companies against their component sales, assets,
and income (42,000 data points). Our approach, however, has beenA CORPORATE VALUATION MODEL 85
Table 2 continued
Corporate Valuation Model: Dow Chemical Company
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Ratio 1.8
simpler: we have divided the universe into 150 industry groups and
done regressions on the pure companies in each of these groups, each
designed to have at least eight companies. Unfortunately, several inter-
esting groups were too small to be valued separately. While it would
have been nice to run separate solutions for aluminum or homebuilding
companies, for example, they were too small and had to be combined
with the metals and general building groups, respectively.
Our regressions were done to produce the following general
formulas:
Capitalization: a*(sales) + b*(assets) + c*(operating income)
4- constant.86 Dean LeBaron and Lawrence S. Speidell
In the current research mode eight regressions are run for each industry.
Separate regressions are run for raw and log data, both with stepwise or
block entering of variables and with a sales growth factor or without.
Log data are used in an effort to counteract the heteroskedasticity in the
data--the increase in variability of market capitalization for larger
companies.
To determine the "best" regression for each industry’s SIC code, we
look for the model that has the narrowest confidence interval for its
prediction of market capitalization. For the raw data regressions, this
means taking the standard error from the regression and multiplying it
by a value from a t-table based on the number of observations and the
number of independent variables in the equation. It is also adjusted for
the prediction of a point at the mean. For the log regressions, a similar
procedure is used, except that once the confidence interval is deter-
mined at the log level, the antilogs must be calculated to bring it back to
the same units as the raw data. The regression that produces the nar-
rowest confidence interval is the 6ne to be used in the segment analysis.
The chosen regression coefficients go into two files. Because some com-
panies do not have a number for growth, they must use the best of the
regressions that do not include growth.
Interestingly, growth in sales does not appear to be particularly
meaningful in most regressions. We are considering alternatives such as
growth in earnings. Also, the stepwise procedure, which enters the in-
dependent variables one by one into the regression and tries to find the
best combination of some or all, has not proved to add much value.
Results
This segment analysis, called the Corporate Valuation Model, or
CVM, takes approximately two and one-half hours to run and produces
scores for 2,773 companies in the Batterymarch stock universe of 3,000
stocks. Scores for the remaining companies cannot be produced because
of missing data or industry problems. Financial stocks are generally not
scored because sales and assets are not good indicators of their value.
Banks and brokerage firms, for example, can leverage themselves up
and down on spread arbitrage business without affecting corporate val-
ue significantly.
For companies scored, the equal-weighted average ratio of theoreti-
cal to actual market capitalization is 1.46, the median is 1.13, and the
capitalization-weighted average is 1.19. We score 438 of the Standard &
Poor’s 500 stocks, and here the average scores are: equal-weighted aver-
age, 1.19; median, 1.10; capitalization-weighted average, 1.20.A CORPORATE VALUATION MODEL 87
Comparison with Market Characteristics
The ratio of theoretical to actual market capitalization (CVM) is com-
pared with 12 investment characteristics in figure 2. In each panel, CVM
data have been divided into deciles, and the equal-weighted average of
each is plotted against a characteristic. In one panel, for example, CVM
is plotted against the price-earnings ratio. The highest decile of CVM
includes 277 stocks with an average CVM ratio of 5 and a price-earnings
ratio of around 15. At the other extreme, the lowest decile of CVM has a
negative value, indicating that the average theoretical value of the 277
stocks in this decile is negative. Their average price-earnings ratio is over
22. Although the relationship is irregular, the curve shows that stocks
with lower price-earnings ratios tend to have higher CVM ratios. A
somewhat similar pattern is shown in the panel showing CVM versus
Estimated Growth Rate (from Ford Investor Services). Here, higher-
growth companies tend to have below-average CVM ratios.
Several panels in figure 2 show patterns of wide variations. These
include Yield, Market Capitalization, Institutional Holdings, Deviation
(Variability of Earnings) and Quality (Value-Line financial strength rat-
ing). In the case of Institutional Holdings, for example, stocks with low
percentages held by institutions tend to have either very high or very
low CVM ratios. To the extent that extreme ratios of CVM are an indica-
tion of lower market efficiency, it appears that stocks with low institu-
tional holdings are inefficiently priced, thus confirming our third initial
hypothesis. Inefficient pricing also appears to occur among stocks with
low yields, small size, low quality and high earnings deviation. Interest-
ingly, these are all characteristics that produce discomfort among inves-
tors, and contrarians would argue that stocks possessing these
characteristics may produce above-average total returns. CVM may be
particularly useful to contrarians because it distinguishes especially well
among stocks that possess contrary characteristics.
Valuation versus Number of Divisions
Figure 3 confirms another of our initial hypotheses. It shows what
appears to be a positive relationship between the number of segments in
a company and the CVM ratio. The more divisions a company has, the
more it is likely to be undervalued.
Industry Characteristics
Business-segment CVM ratios have been developed for roughly 400
of the 600 SIC groups. (Those with few companies are "rolled up" to a
broader definition.) In order to generalize about industry characteristics,88 Dean LeBaron and Lawrence S. Speidell
Figure 2
Comparison of the Ratio of Theoretical to Market Capitalization (CVM)
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Figure 3
Comparison of Number of Business Segments in an Industry






1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Segments
aRatio of a firm’s theoretical value (using the corporate valuation model) to its market value.
Source: Batterymarch Financial Management.
however, it was found useful to group the data into 55 industry groups,
which are shown in figures 4 and 5.
Figure 4 compares capitalization-weighted (CVM) ratios for "im-
pure" or multi-industry companies, grouped by their primary industry,
with ratios for pure companies located in the same industries. Since the
ratios are weighted by capitalization, it is natural that the industry aver-
ages for pure companies are close to 1. The Y-axis, however, shows that
multi-industry companies vary widely in their valuation. Diversified
companies in transportation, leisure and consumer durables appear
overvalued by the market while those in the cosmetics, hotel, aerospace
and computer industries appear to be undervalued. Although general-
izations can be misleading, it appears that breakup opportunities are
greater in more glamorous industries, because investors "pay up" forA CORPORATE VALUATION MODEL 91
Figure 4
Comparison of Pure and Multi-Industry Companies,
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specialists that occupy a market niche. In less glamorous industries,
diversified companies are given more generous valuations.
Figure 5 presents the same comparisons but uses equal weights for
all companies to construct the industry average. The effect is to place
more importance on smaller companies than in figure 4. The X-axis posi-
tion of each industry shows a clear difference among pure companies
from the vertical centering around 1 in figure 4. In rethiling, hotels,
drugs and pollution control, for example, small companies tend to have
higher capitalization ratios than large ones, whereas the reverse is true
in domestic petroleum, oil services, autos and shipping. Again, there
may be a pattern related to the "glamor" of the industry, where small92 Dean LeBaron and Lawrence S. Speidell
Figure 5
Unweighted Comparison of Pure and Multi-Industry
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companies in industries that are unpopular sell at a premium while
those in favored industries sell at a discount. In executing a small-stock
strategy, it might make sense to avoid industries that are out of favor.
Although results of our regression analysis are still in the research
stage, we have some interesting findings. As mentioned earlier, growth
in sales does not appear to be a significant factor in most cases. Our
regressions would not distinguish between two competing companies
with identical sales, assets and income, one of which had experienced a
decline in market share while the other had experienced an increase.
While this confirms our suspicion that the market undervalues changes
in market share, we still believe that our equations could be improved byA CORPORATE VALUATION MODEL 93
including some growth measure. We will be experimenting with income
growth data, but their instability will require some smoothing. In addi-
tion, the universe will shrink because many companies have changed
their reporting format, grouping divisions in different categories over
the years.
There are several interesting surprises in the regression coefficients.
In roughly half of the cases, the coefficient for sales is negative, suggest-
ing that corporate value shrinks with size. In some of these cases, the
explanation is that industry income is negative; but in others, large com-
panies may be dinosaurs, producing commodity products and losing
more profitable customers to smaller niche specialists. Industries with a
negative coefficient on sales include chemicals, electrical equipment,
telephones and cosmetics. In other industries, sales are unimportant,
with a coefficient close to zero. These include oil refining, computers
and autos. On the other hand, the reverse is true in radio and television
broadcasting, where both assets and income have coefficients close to
zero and value depends almost entirely on sales.
Of course, coefficients will change over time with industry and eco-
nomic cycles. The regressions are a cross-sectional snapshot capturing
companies that seem out of place at this instant. Expectations may ex-
plain much of this, and we have plans to include estimated income,
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, to supplement current
reported income.
Conclusions
Business-segment analysis suggests that there are opportunities to
add value by separating multi-industry companies into their parts. In
addition, even with our current, relatively crude techniques, there do
appear to be significant patterns in the market. Different industries are
valued in different ways and our "Chop Shop" analysis may lead us to
industry-specific valuation models with implications beyond the analy-
sis of business segments.
The question of why the parts are worth more than the whole for
many companies is of particular interest since the reverse was true 20
years ago, when conglomerates were in vogue and synergy was men-
tioned in nearly every annual report. We suggested earlier some expla-
nations for the current condition, such as the "closed-end fund_effect"
and the high cost of information. But there are other issues about which
we can speculate.
(1) Cynicism versus naivete. After the poor performance of corporate
profits in recent years, investors may have grown cynical-about
the talents of high-priced managers. In the 1960s, we believed94 Dean LeBaron and I~wrence S. Speidell
we could manage the economy, at both the government and
the corporate levels. Now we may have gone too far, but we
are all aware of the limited influence of management in the face
of overwhelming and often unknown external influences such
as the oil crisis and inflation. Even some of the companies cited
for great management skill in books like In Search of Excellence
have shown disappointing subsequent results. It is not that
management is ineffective, simply that management is less in-
fluential than managers themselves would like. In today’s en-
vironment, investors prefer situations where the management
tasks are made simpler by fewer divisions.
(2) Inflation and hidden assets. Many of today’s multi-industry com-
panies were formed over 15 years ago. Divisions acquired then
have disappeared from close investor scrutiny for a long period
while inflation has distorted their asset values. As recent re-
structurings have shown, much of the merchandise that disap-
peared into "corporate attics" in the late 1960s is worth far more
than book value on the open market today. Despite experi-
ments with inflation accounting (Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board Statement 33), most of our accounting and
reporting framework has focused financial analysis on histori-
cal costs, leaving investors ill-equipped to anticipate the "hid-
den assets" of complex companies.
(3) Agency problems and the control premium. Some of the current
discount of multi-industry companies may reflect the agency
problems of managements and shareholders in recent years.
Contests for control and increased antitakeover provisions
have made investors conscious of the importance of control.
The more complex a company is, the more valuable will be
control over its restructuring decisions. If investors believe
they have lost the ability to affect those decisions, either by
influencing or by changing management, then the stock prices
will drop.
We see several directions in which the current conditions may lead.
We may be witnessing a change in the nature of common stocks that will
signal the end of shareholder ownership as we have known it. It could
be that corporations are indeed becoming closed-end funds. It could be
that common stocks are becoming a form of nonvoting preferred stock,
with a dividend tied to earnings. This would bring us closer to other
world markets, where the discount for lack of control is 10 times as great
as the 3 to 4 percent spread in our market today. The resulting increase
in the cost of capital to our economy would be large.
More likely, however, is a continuation of active corporate restruc-
turings with the goal of simplification. We believe the interests of share-A CORPORATE VALUATION MODEL 95
holders and management are coming together, as managers are
increasingly aware that a high stock price ’is their best protection against
takeover. This should lead to increased management incentives based
on stock price, improved shareholder relations, and more active partici-
pation by shareholders in corporate decisions. Spinoffs and sales of divi-
sions will continue. A related development may be partial public
ownership of divisions to establish their market value (similar to the
program tried by LTV in the early 1970s). In this environment, we hope
that the companies identified by our business segment analysis will be
market leaders."Chop Shop" is a provocative model based on an insight that can be
expressed in three different but closely related forms. "Chop Shop" is, at
once: (1) a closed-end fund valuation model; (2) a statement about how a
corporate raider might value a potential target; and (3) an implementa-
tion of arbitrage pricing theory. Each perspective complements the oth-
ers. Indeed, by viewing the model from these three different vantage
points, it may be possible to develop a richer understanding of the basic
trading problem presented by the authors: How do you spot underval-
ued companies before the rest of the market, and how do you profit
from that information?
The Conglomerate as Closed-End Fund
From one perspective, "Chop Shop" views a conglomerate firm as a
closed-end investment company holding a portfolio of nontraded securi-
ties that represent equity interests in identifiable lines of business. By
estimating the open-market value of each of those closely held securi-
ties, the model infers the value that the stock market would assign to the
conglomerate if, by creating a publicly traded security for each line of
business and then spinning that security off to its stockholders, the
conglomerate converted itself into the equivalent of an open-end fund.
There is substantial evidence that closed-end funds trade at a dis-
count to net asset value.1 Further, some conglomerates have recently
*Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The views expressed
herein are the author’s, and do not reflect those of the Commission, other Commissioners,
or Commission staff.DISCUSSION 97
begun to spin off subsidiaries in an effort to convert themselves into
more open-ended structures in which separate lines of business are in-
dependently valued.2 "Chop Shop," if it works, represents an appraisal
technique designed to estimate the increase in value that the market
would assign to an open-ended conglomerate as opposed to its closed-
ended analogue.
The Conglomerate as Bust-Up Target
The more immediate inspiration for "Chop Shop" arises from take-
over bidders who acquire conglomerates for the purpose of subdividing
them into separate lines of business that are then sold off. Such transac-
tions effectively transform closed-end conglomerates into more valuable
economic structures. The rhetoric associated with these transactions (for
example, "bust-up" deals) is most unfortunate because it conjures up the
image of a scorched earth policy that leads to massive plant shutdowns
and inefficient economic dislocations.
The evidence, however, is quite the opposite. For example, a recent
study by Michael E. Porter suggests that a large percentage of conglom-
erate acquisitions are failures because the acquired operations do not
rationally add value to the firm’s overall performance (Porter 1987). Sig-
nificantly, the transactions in Porter’s sample are predominantly the re-
sult of friendly corporate acquisitions and Porter suggests that economic
value can be created by breaking up conglomerate structures that result
from these friendly transactions.
Such breakups will permit some subsidiaries to operate as free-
standing entities subject to independent capital market discipline in-
stead of the bureaucratic internal budgeting discipline employed in most
conglomerate organizations. Alternatively, divisions that are sold off to
other firms are typically combined with operations in similar lines of
business. These combinations can take advantage of economies of scale
and scope unavailable in the conglomerate form. Thus, Porter’s research
suggests that friendly takeovers may, on occasion, create inefficient con-
glomerate structures that can be beneficially unraveled through a re-
structuring that causes a realignment of corporate divisions. The
analysis thereby strongly supports "bust-up" transactions that are fre-
quently vilified in the press.
Viewed from this perspective, "Chop Shop" provides an estimate of
the increased value that results from the subdivision of a conglomerate
into entities that focus on defined lines of business. No doubt, bidders
considering conglomerate acquisitions engage in similar analyses. "Chop
See, for example, Brickley and Schallheim (1985); Brauer (1984); and Brauer (1988).
See, for example, Rose (1988).98 Joseph A. Grundfest
Shop" can thus be thought of as an effort to estimate the reservation
price that a bidder might assign to a conglomerate as a result of the gains
that could be earned by restructuring the firm.
"Chop Shop" as an Arbitrage Pricing Theory Model
The arbitrage pricing theory is based on a relatively simple but pow-
erful insight: identical items should sell at identical prices because any
price differences can be arbitraged away. This "law of one price" suggests
that the return on any one stock can be expressed as a linear combina-
tion of various indexes, that is:
Vi = ai + bi~I1 + bi212 + . . . + biiIi + e~.
In the case of "Chop Shop," the underlying hypothesis is that the
law of one price and associated arbitrage should equalize the value of a
conglomerate and the value of the conglomerate’s component parts. By
relating the conglomerate’s value, Vi, to a set of indexes that describe the
value of the conglomerate’s constituent lines of business, Ii, "Chop
Shop" seeks to estimate the value that the law of one price would im-
pute to a conglomerate if the market were given an opportunity to en-
gage in the necessary arbitrage.3
Synthesis
In "Chop Shop," all three of these views come together as one. The
bust-up transaction is modelled as an exercise in open-ending a closed-
end fund and is also revealed as an application of the law of one price.
The model does not explain the source of the undervaluation, but that is
not the model’s purpose: the model is designed to be purely predictive
and its purpose is to serve as a valuable trading rule for its developers.
The model’s ability to predict may, however, be seriously con-
strained by currently employed estimation techniques and data. The
model’s current estimation approach, which relies on a linear regression
on predetermined indexes with certain fixed weights as explanatory fac-
tors, may place unnecessary constraints on the underlying analytic ap-
proach. A factor analysis technique that relies on a richer data set and
assumes fewer constraints on the variables that are most useful as ex-
planatory factors may lead to better results (Elton and Gruber 1987, pp.
344-48). This approach could incorporate additional variables such as
cash flow and other performance measures that are likely to be informa-
See generally, Elton and Gruber (1987) and especially pp. 336-54.DISCUSSION 99
tive in predicting a conglomerate’s potential breakup value.
To the extent the model relies solely on publicly available data that
can be gleaned from annual reports and SEC filings, the model fails to
incorporate some of the information most valuable to a "bust-up" analy-
sis and subjects itself to some serious vagaries in accounting practice. In
a bust-up transaction, in which each division is eventually sold to the
highest bidder, the best estimate of a division’s value may well be its
replacement cost. That cost is most commonly estimated through market
appraisals that do not rely at all on accounting data as reported in public
filings. Indeed, to the extent that accounting data focus on historical cost
measures that do not reflect current market values, those data are par-
ticularly unsuited to the market valuation task that is critical to the mod-
el’s mission.
Further, the vagaries of FASB’s Statement No. 14, which provides
the basis for line of business reporting, have been frequently noted in
the literature. In particular, "[q]uestions have been raised regarding the
usefulness of the segment approach to forecasting because of potential
data contamination. This contamination is perceived to arise because of
difficulties in classifying firm activities into segments and the arbitrari-
ness of transfer pricing and joint cost allocation. Because of the prob-
lems, it is possible that the use of segment data may lead to invalid
forecasts" (Horwitz and Kolodny 1980, p. 27). In many respects, howev-
er, this criticism is simply a fact of life with which "Chop Shop" must live
because, whatever the drawbacks of publicly reported line-of-business
data prepared in accordance with FASB Statement No. 14, those are the
only available data upon which the model can operate.
Can "Chop Shop" Become a Profitable Trading Rule?
Suppose that "Chop Shop" evolves into a highly accurate valuation
model that estimates the discount the market applies to a conglomerate’s
shares. The authors suggest that they might, in the spirit of financial
"glasnost," make their model available to other investors so that they
would be willing to bid the conglomerate’s shares to a higher value
(LeBaron and Speidell 1987).
If the authors seek to profit from this research they will, however,
have to proceed carefully. If they simply disclose the best version of their
model, other investors will be able to acquire shares as rapidly as the
inventors and few profitable opportunities will be available for them.
Accordingly, they cannot place their work in the public domain if they
are to profit.
Instead, the authors will have to develop a credible signalling strate-
gy in which they first accumulate positions and then explain to the100 Joseph A. Grundfest
market why they believe the companies in which they invest are under-
valued. The explanation will have to be sufficiently persuasive that other
investors will acquire shares, bid up the company’s price, and still per-
ceive an opportunity for profit because they expect yet another increase
in share price after their acquisition.
Alternatively, the authors may want to adopt substantially more
passive or aggressive strategies. At the passive end of the spectrum, the
authors may want to abandon the idea of popularizing their model and
simply rely on market forces to recognize the discounts identified by
"Chop Shop." Several mutual fund managers attempt to identify future
takeover targets by analyzing cash flow estimates and underlying asset
values. Instead of popularizing these predictions, these managers invest
in promising takeover candidates and then sit on the sidelines while
nature takes its course. At the aggressive end of the spectrum, the au-
thors can get into the acquisition business directly. After all, if their
model is an accurate predictor of realizable values that are not fully
incorporated into market prices, the authors may well be able to maxi-
mize the value of their information by directly participating in takeover
activity.
This last observation emphasizes a major implementation problem
that is not addressed in "Chop Shop" or any other valuation model of its
genre: identification of a potential discount is not a sufficient condition
for profitable trading. Profits cannot be realized until there is a realistic
plan for eliminating the conglomerate’s discount and passing those
gains through to the corporation’s stockholders. Put another way, "Chop
Shop" may be able to identify a conglomerate trading at a substantial
discount, but if the conglomerate’s management holds a majority of the
corporation’s shares and if management has committed itself to continue
in its conglomerate strategy, the simple fact that the conglomerate’s
shares are trading at a substantial discount does not suggest that the
discount is unwarranted or that purchasing the conglomerate’s shares
would be a profitable acquisition.
Thus, the analysis needs to go a step further and evaluate the prob-
ability that an identified discount can be eliminated in the marketplace.
Simply identifying the existence of a discount from some valuation that
is reasonable, but perhaps difficult or impossible to attain, will not cause
the price of a conglomerate’s shares to rise to that value.DISCUSSION 101
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